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Populism and the Politics of Redemption 
 
Abstract 
This article re-examines current definitions of populism, which portray it as either a 
powerful corrective to representative democracy or as a mortal danger to it. It does so 
by exploring a crucial but often ignored dimension of populism: redemptive politics. 
Populism is here understood to function according to the logic of resentment, which 
involves both socio-political indignation and envy or ressentiment. In either case, 
populism has a distinctive redemptive character. Populism is oriented towards the 
future, but does not ignore the past. Highly moralized images of the past are used by 
populist leaders to castigate the present and promise the eminent advent of a new 
future. The argument is illustrated with Caesar’s Column, a futuristic novel written by 
the Minnesota populist leader Ignatius Donnelly. The complex and ambivalent 
structure of the novel, which served as a textual source for the Populist Party 
manifesto in the 1890s, enables us to move beyond the positions dominating the 
current debate. Reading Caesar’s Column ultimately shows that populism can be both 









Populism, both as a political phenomenon and a political term, is an American 
creation. The American Populism of the 1890s refers to a political experiment which 
began as a social protest movement arising from the Farmers’ Alliances in about 
1890, became institutionalised in several southern and western states in the course of 
that decade as the Populist (or the People’s) party, reached the zenith of its 
significance with the Presidential campaign of 1896 of the Populist nominee, William 
Jennings Bryan, whose defeat against the Republican candidate William McKinley 
rapidly led to its dissolution as an independent political movement. Populism, upper 
case, soon became populism, lower case, a chameleonic creature that spread across 
the world, often quite independently from its origins in the United States of the late 
nineteenth century. The twentieth century was witness to countless manifestations of 
this political phenomenon. Between the 1940s and 1960s, the populist epicentre was 
in Latin America. Since the late 1980s, “neo-populism” has been employed to 
characterize first the leftist politics of Latin American leaders such as Hugo Chávez or 
Evo Morales and then a plethora of right-wing movements in Western and Eastern 
Europe. The aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis has brought with it one of its most 
vigorous re-emergences of all times, both at the right and left of the ideological 
spectrum, both in consolidated Western democracies and elsewhere. 
 This article takes this recent re-emergence of the phenomenon as its starting 
point. It sets itself two tasks. One is of conceptual clarification. The current 
proliferation in media, political, and scholarly discourses of terms such as “populist” 
or “populism” has done little to clarify what they connote, and how exactly do they 
relate to other concepts, maxime democracy. The other, related goal is to expand our 
understanding of populism by exploring one of its constitutive dimensions. We call 
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this dimension the politics of (populist) redemption. Generally speaking, redemptive 
politics refers to the promise of a future better world. The politics of scepticism, by 
contrast, is fundamentally pragmatic: it has much lower expectations of what 
government can achieve and is suspicious both of power and enthusiasm. The 
assumption of redemptive politics is that social reform and political change are 
eminently within the remit of possibilities of governmental action. Politics is thus a 
matter of bringing perfection or salvation to this world. (Canovan 1999: 8; Oakeshott 
1996: 21-38)  
Redemptive politics has two dimensions. One is temporal. It is decidedly 
future-oriented but it involves a reference to past and present experience (Emirbayer 
and Mische 1998: 983 ff.). This orientation towards the future means that redemptive 
politics is often analysed as a form of utopianism. Depending on how the future is 
imagined, utopianism can take two basic forms (Abensour 2008; Jacoby 2005; 
Levitas 2007; Geuss 2017). One type is programmatic utopianism. Here the 
redemptive promise of a better world includes a more or less detailed description of 
how to get there and what that future holds for us. The other form is open-ended 
utopianism. In this case, the emphasis is on using a vision of a more perfect future in 
order to criticise the present rather than on offering a blueprint of the future, which is 
left undefined. The other dimension of redemptive politics is moral. The ways past, 
present and future are depicted are highly idealised. This is also the case with populist 
redemptive politics, whose distinctive temporal-moral structure can be found in all the 
historical manifestations of this phenomenon, from the American populists of the 
1890s to the present day. That populism has a redemptive dimension has been noted 
before. Indeed, one of earliest and more trenchant criticisms ever levelled at 
American Populism focussed precisely on its redemptive character (Hofstadter 1955). 
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Yet the exact nature of the relationship between populism and the politics of 
redemption remains elusive.  
Our argument can be summarized as follows. In Section 1, we review the 
existing literature on the relationship between populism and redemption. We identify 
two basic positions: while one uses this relationship to stress the democratic potential 
of populism, the other finds in it the proof that populism is a danger to democracy. 
There are problems with both positions, however, which we address by advancing a 
new understanding of populism. By proposing a new definition of populism (Section 
2), which includes a distinctive redemptive dimension (Section 3), that we illustrate 
this with the case of the populist utopian novel Caesar’s Column (Section 4), we 
bring new light to both these dimensions. Temporally, Caesar’s Column presents us 
with an instance of populist redemptive politics that cuts across the distinction 
between programmatic and open-ended utopianism. This raises important questions as 
to not only the nature of redemptive/utopian political projects, but regarding the 
character of populism itself. Morally, re-examining the temporal-moral structure of 
populism promises to help us enlarge our understanding of the ways in which it is 
related to democracy. Caesar’s Column’s plot contains the two basic forms of 
utopianism: as critique of the present and as a blueprint of a future perfect society. 
This mirrors the equivalent ambivalence of redemptive populist politics as social text. 
It is this ambivalence that ultimately explains its equally ambivalent relationship with 
democracy.   
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1. Literature Review 
The analysis of populism as a specific type of ‘politics of faith’ has been the subject 
of much discussion at least since the publication of John D. Hicks’ study, The 
Populist Revolt (1931). A professor in American history, Hicks is the first of a long 
line of commentators to use the redemptive character of Populism to stress its 
democratic credentials. Populism’s promise of a future better world emerges in Hicks’ 
writings as a political answer to the agrarian economic difficulties of the 
Reconstruction Era, and specifically as a frontier phenomenon as the hard times were 
particularly dire in the newly settled area. Like Hicks, C. Vann Woodwards, both in 
Tom Watson (1938) and in Origins of the New South (1951), sees the Populists as 
major sources for twentieth century liberalism, manifested in the Progressive 
movement and the New Deal. Morison and Commager, in The Growth of the 
American Republic (1953: 236-241), reiterate this assessment and depict Populism as 
a radical democratic political response to an authoritarian government that grew 
increasingly hostile to agrarian interests.  
This benevolent and approving reading of American Populism continues in the 
1960s. American historian Norman Pollack describes the grass-roots world of 
Midwestern Populism in The Populist Response to Industrial America (1962). The 
redemptive quality of Populism emerges organically as a kind of “folk-wisdom” that 
enabled Populists to formulate an extraordinarily penetrating critique of industrial 
society. A progressive social force, Midwestern Populism involved a perfectionist 
conception of human self-fulfilment. The goal of Populism, Pollack explains, “was 
‘the hope of realizing and incarnating in the lives of the common people the fullness 
of the divinity of humanity.’” (1962: 13) In the following year, Walter Nugent 
publishes The Tolerant Populists, a still unsurpassed historical study of Populism in 
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Kansas, the heartland of Great Plains Populism. Taking recourse to thousands of 
textual sources, namely Populist leaders’ speeches and editorials, Nugent carefully 
reconstructs the Populists’ promise of a better future. This comes in the form of a 
vision of America as the promised land of abundance, equal opportunity and equitable 
distribution of wealth. In the Populist rhetoric, the United States is a community of 
destiny, which not only embodies democratic republicanism, where the people rule, 
but also true economic democracy. Implied in this rhetoric is the unnatural division 
between “us, the people”, who created wealth, and “them”, those who manipulated 
wealth already produced. This idealised but betrayed America, which draws 
inspiration and legitimation in the American Revolution, provides Populists with a 
concrete basis to undertake a social critique of the present, which is reinforced by the 
projection of a powerful redemptive image of the future (Nugent 1963: 178-180).  
 In 1969, in the collection that inaugurates the modern theoretical populist 
literature, British sociologist Peter Worsley continues this strand with a crucial 
innovation. Like his American colleagues before him, Worsley questions the 
reduction of democracy to the institutionalisation of opposition and to the periodic 
change of government, and emphasises “the involvement of the people in governing 
their own lives.” (1969: 246) But Worsley moves beyond them in his 
conceptualisation of populism, which ceases to be an ontic category, with a certain 
substantive content (ideology, rhetoric, etc.), to become a logic or way of organising 
contents: an “emphasis” in the political culture of a given community. This emphasis 
is neither democratic nor anti-democratic in itself: although authoritarian movements 
can indeed claim to represent the people and appeal to direct forms of participation, so 
do egalitarian and reform movements. Populism, Worsley concludes, is perfectly 
compatible with democracy.  
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 These two moves by Worsley, his emphasis on participation and his rejection 
of an ontic understanding of populism, mark a watershed in the populist literature. 
Three of the most significant recent attempts at extracting the democratic potential of 
populism out of its redemptive dimension have all taken their lead from Worsley’s 
1969 essay. One of the most influential is Ernesto Laclau’s neo-Gramscian theory of 
hegemony, whose development begins in the late 1970s and culminates with On 
Populist Reason in 2005. For Laclau, the inherent capacity of populism to include 
new social groups in the democratic process goes hand in hand with its utopian 
character (2005: 167). In fact, Laclau’s writings on populism can be read as an 
attempt to reconstruct socialism as a populist utopia. At the heart of Laclau’s populist 
utopia is the concept of “the people”. This is because, as Laclau forcefully puts it, 
“the political operation par excellence is always going to be the construction of ‘a 
people’” (2005: 153). It is an empty, or (as in the full-fledged version of the theory) 
floating, signifier. This suggests that “the people” is a kind of alternative empty 
horizon that can take different shapes and be interpreted in different ways. These 
different interpretations are brought together around a shared imaginary, which 
remains empty and without definite content. It is a kind of “enacted utopia”, which 
can be seen in demonstrations, street protests and other forms of direct action 
(Sargisson 2014). A second important contribution is Benjamin Arditi’s, who claims 
that while populism can be a potentially dangerous underside of democracy, it can 
also function as a redemptive force or democratic promise within the democratic 
system (Arditi 2003). A third significant voice in this conversation is Margaret 
Canovan’s (1999), who describes it as a “redemptive style of politics” which provides 
an alternative to the dry pragmatism of representative democracy. This “politics of 
faith” emerge as populism exploits the gap between promise and performance in 
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democracy, as in the case of the original American Populism of the 1890s (1999: 12) 
and in numerous times of crisis ever since. However diverse in its disciplinary 
affiliations and epistemological assumptions (see also e.g. Hayward 1996), this strand 
of populist literature nevertheless converges in one central point: the assertion that 
populism is a type of redemptive politics helps explain its compatibility with 
democracy, insofar democracy is not enclosed in its liberal format. 
For others, however, the redemptive nature of populist betrays its anti-
democratic nature. One of the earliest examples of this position is found in The Age of 
Reform (1955), by the American historian Richard Hofstadter. Hofstadter breaks with 
Hicks’s approving reading of the Populists in two fundamental regards. First, he 
breaks with Hicks’s periodization, which was typical of the Progressive 
historiography that traced a continuous path of reform from the 1890s through the 
1930s. According to Hofstadter’s own periodization, the New Deal (1930s) marks a 
sharp, pragmatic departure from the redemptive, ideologically-driven Populists 
(1890s) and Progressives (1900-1914). Implicit in this new periodization is 
Hofstadter’s second crucial break with Hicks: a novel understanding of the character 
of Populist redemptive politics. Fundamentally retrogressive, the Populists’ nostalgia 
for an agrarian past – the “agrarian myth”, a view that glamorized farming, country 
life and the self-sufficient yeoman, and saw this pastoral past as conducive to moral 
and civic virtue – is mobilised to explain their fears of modernity and no small 
amount of bigotry, a “complex of fear and suspicion of the stranger that haunted, and 
tragically still haunts, the nativist American mind.” (1955: 82) Hofstadter is among 
the first American historians to make use of social scientific concepts and 
explanations to account for the Populists’ redemptive politics. Although Hofstadter 
was ready to concede that the Populists were anything but oblivious regarding their 
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material conditions, the key explanatory factor of Progressive historiography, he 
places at the core of his argument the loss of social status.  
Hofstadter’s focus on attitudes signals the growing influence of behavioural 
science among historians in the 1950s. In fact, Hofstadter’s use of social-scientific 
concepts hints at a more general attempt by social scientists to reassess American 
Populism in a fundamentally negative light. Victor Ferkiss, a political scientist with a 
background on psychological warfare, went as far as associating the redemptive 
Populist mind to American fascism: “these populist beliefs and attitudes”, Ferkiss 
writes, “form the core of Pound’s philosophy, just as they provide the basis of 
American fascism generally.” (1955: 174) Yet, conceptually speaking, it were 
sociologists who took the lead in this negative reassessment of Populism. Sociologists 
saw the Populists’ redemptive vision as a combination of irrationality and class 
resentment. In addition, unlike historians such as Hofstadter who used class 
resentment to emphasise the retrogressive character of this orientation (but also 
Lerner 1957: 49), they claimed that this redemptive vision translated itself into future-
oriented attitudes. Seymour Martin Lipset (1955) uses the peculiar social attitudes of 
the Populists to explain why they bypassed the distinction between movements that 
occur during economic depressions, which are explained by real material losses, and 
protest movements that arise in periods of economic prosperity, which are motivated 
by seeking to improve or maintain their social status position. While clearly a 
depression-based movement with roots in real abuses, the Populists were also 
motivated by status resentment. For Lipset, this singularity can be traced back to the 
peculiar redemptive vision of the Populists, in which bringing salvation to this world 
went hand in hand with irrational scapegoat-seeking (e.g. Jews) on which to heap 
their resentment. Edward Shils, in The Torment of Secrecy (1956), finds in the 
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Populists redemptive mind-set one of the “deeper sources” of twentieth-century 
security-mindedness. Although rooted in the late nineteenth-century Populists, this 
mentality of conspiracy-mindedness soon moved beyond the Midwest to be found “in 
the National Socialist movement in Germany, in British fascism, in American 
populism and more broadly in Bolshevist and Fascist movements in all countries.” 
(1956: 31) Talcott Parsons (1955) rejects to reduce the populist redemptive vision to 
either a matter of rational choice or to the blind impact of institutional factors. Rather, 
Parsons depicts it as an anti-elite and anti-East orientation, which results from the 
class resentment of downwardly mobile farmers. David Riesman and Nathan Glazer 
(1955), in turn, found in the redemptive rhetoric of the Populists the distant origins of 
McCarthyism itself.  
Many of these themes and preoccupations have been explored, both by 
scholars and political commentators (e.g. Blumenthal 1987), by subsequent opponents 
of populism who continue to find in its singular redemptive nature a serious threat to a 
constitutional conception of democracy, individual rights and the balancing of 
powers. An irrational excess of egalitarianism, populism bears the seeds of tyranny 
(Taguieff 1995; Urbinati 1998). One of the most articulate recent expressions of this 
position is by Abts and Rummens (2007). Drawing upon Schmitt’s theory of 
democracy, they suggest that populism projects a “fictitious” vision of the people as a 
homogeneous and sovereign political entity. This “imaginary fiction of a closed, 
collective identity” would, according to this understanding, suppress the individual 
differences that underpin democracy, which is thought to be based on the idea of “an 
open and diverse society” (2007: 415; see also Müller 2016).  
There are problems with both positions, however. The first position, by 
connoting populism with popular participation, does not provide the necessary 
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conceptual means to analyse how and when populism becomes dangerous. The 
second position fails to appreciate the potentially democratic nature of the redemptive 
dimension of populist politics. This is partly because, we believe, of a defective 





2. Populism as a Logic of Political Action 
Populism exists in a tense, fundamental ambivalent relationship with democracy. We 
agree with the opponents of populism that resentment plays a crucial role in populist 
politics. We believe, however, that to reduce resentment to social attitudes, or any 
other ontic content such as discourse, rhetoric, etc., is fundamentally problematic. 
This is because ontic approaches tend to describe populism as to accurately represent 
the “natural divisions of the real world” (Wiles 1969: 171), as if such divisions were 
definable independently of the deep structures of meaning associated with the very 
practice of definition. Since we believe they are not, i.e. that they are socially 
constructed, means that our position is epistemologically closer to that of some of the 
advocates of populism, namely those who argue that rather than focussing on the 
contents of populism we should focus on the logic according to which such contents 
are organised (e.g. Laclau 2005). Yet the “oppositional logic” identified by Laclau, 
which he derives from Carl Schmitt’s critique of liberal democracy, does not seem 
adequate to account for populism. This is for two reasons. First, enmity is not the true 
populist logic because populism involves some degree of identification between the 
parts. Enmity, in either Schmitt’s Volkish rendition or in Laclau’s post-structuralist 
version, does not. Second, Laclau’s argument that the logic of populism is the logic of 
politics as such begs the question of what is, after all, specific about it?  
 While Laclau argues that the logic of populism is the key to understanding 
politics as such, we argue that populism is an outgrowth of democracy and its logic 
cannot be understood apart from democracy’s fundamental commitment to the 
principle of equality. To put it more simply, populism results from a paradox at the 
heart of democracy. An impulse towards universal inclusion is inscribed in the 
democratic project. However, it so happens that exclusion is constitutive of inclusion.  
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Exclusion is therefore unavoidable. With every attempt to broaden inclusion, new 
forms of exclusion emerge. No matter how hard democracy attempts to dissolve 
boundaries, new ones keep cropping up. Consider, for instance, how in a 
constitutional democracy rights have an inherent dynamic towards universal 
inclusion, but will very often remain reserved to citizens alone, and informally out of 
reach for even some of them. Exclusions affecting noncitizens, let alone those 
affecting citizens themselves, are especially unsettling in democracies because they 
contend with the understanding of democracy as an inclusive community, built upon 
perfectly symmetrical relationships, hinging on the recognition of universal freedom 
and equality. Being constitutive for inclusion, exclusion is inescapable, but concrete 
exclusions are not necessarily so. Given their normative foundation on the principle of 
equality among persons and popular sovereignty (Morgan, 1989), democracies are the 
regime in which such exclusions become more insufferable and their contingent 
character most visible. As a result, democracy is always haunted by a potential for 
disillusionment and disaffection (Gest, 2016). This is the seedbed of populism, which 
works according to a logic that involves both a comparative and a normative element. 
This logic, we contend, is resentment (Demertzis 2006; Ure 2014; Engels 2015).  
This marks a significant departure from the behaviourist approaches discussed 
above, in which resentment refers to social attitudes that help explain populist 
politics. Our understanding, by contrast, is that resentment should be seen as a logic 
of social and political action. This better captures how populism works and its 
specific character. Logic is here not a formal system of inference, nor is it Laclau’s 
‘special grammar governing each sphere of human activity’ (Laclau, 1999: 102). 
Rather than claiming that the logic of resentment functions as an ontological feature 
of all politics (and therefore also of populism), we make the much narrower claim 
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that, for all its redefinition in the changing context of history, populism has certain 
necessary features that are amenable to logical analysis. To be precise, we claim that 
populism is moved by a logic of resentment, operating within and mobilized by 
democracy’s egalitarian commitments. This logic, even though it determines much of 
‘the objects which it is possible to constitute’ and ‘the relations that are possible 
between those objects’ (Laclau, 1999: 102), does not determine them fully. Still it 
gives us sufficient grounds to distinguish certain phenomena as populist. 
The logic of resentment, in an argument that can be traced back to Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric, governs certain emotions that concern the fortune of others. Three emotions 
are considered: indignation (nemesis), envy (phthonos), and emulation (zêlos), which 
together produce resentment (Aristotle 2007: 154ff.). The upshot of Aristotle’s 
discussion is that the operation of the logic of resentment, under which the three 
emotions fall, supposes the two agents involved in it to be parties to the same game 
(see Geuss, 2016: 170ff.). If this is obviously the case with emulation and indignation, 
where the parties are still construed as moral partners, Aristotle is clear that even in 
envy some sort of identification is required: we envy only those whom we perceive to 
be ‘like us’ in some respect. (2007: 144) The issue at stake here is the perceived 
relative positions of the few and the many. Whether one part of the people perceive 
their situation as inferior or superior relative to the position of the other part of the 
people. This is why envy is different from hatred. We hate enemies, and feel not 
simply different but denied by them. But we envy only those who are sufficiently like 
us to be perceived as some kind of rivals or competitors. Unlike enmity, then, the 
rivalries of resentment presuppose identification. 
Resentment will often concern the identification and protection of certain 
norms regulating our social and political relationships, notably, in the case of 
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populism, the democratic principles of equal concern and respect, and therefore it will 
be sensitive to the issue of the perceived fairness of the situation. We resent the 
(perceived) violation of norms of justice; we resent the harms committed and suffered 
by us in result of this violation; and we resent those whom we deem responsible for 
the violation. However, the question of the deservingness (equity, fairness) of the 
situation in the subject’s eyes poses itself differently according to the emotion in 
question. Indignation patterns social situations involving a general moral concern for 
justice: we feel indignant before the denial of moral entitlements or the breach of 
obligations that constitute our relationships with other agents. Present in the case of 
indignation, such an appeal to a shared normative framework seems to be absent in 
the case of envy. Envy of another’s good fortune works not only regardless of the way 
they act or judge us, but also regardless of any expectation of acquiring the good for 
oneself (if suffices that other are deprived of it). This type of envy is very problematic 
politically. It can result in universalized injury or in a deepening of social injuries 
befalling the envious themselves: for example, when lower-class citizens (seemingly 
paradoxically) oppose public policies from which they would arguably benefit, such 
as those promoting social and economic equality (Cramer, 2016). They might feel 
they are not getting their fair share. But the feeling that others are but do not deserve 
can become their primary political driver. We have mentioned deservingness here. In 
effect, Aristotle, at least implicitly, seems to think that even envy might not be 
entirely immune to questions of ‘personal desert,’ i.e. to claims that are grounded in 
the value people themselves perceive to have (one’s ‘fair share’). He says people are 
particularly envious of things that they themselves ‘desire or think they ought to have’ 
(2007: 145). There is a difference, however, in the ways indignation and envy relate 
to norms. While a more general moral concern for justice underpins indignation, in 
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envy our concern is a particular, personal concern for what we consider as our 
undeserved inferiority. In both cases, resentment operates in the present. Future 
expectations and memories of the past are not directly involved in its operation: 
typically one does not envy a projection of our neighbour’s future gains, or feels 
especially indignant with past grievances. Envy and indignation pattern social 
situations here and now.  
But if envy might still imply a modicum of resentment, understood as a 
“moral” emotion, resentment does not necessarily imply comparison. To explain, 
resentment can be sensitive to the normative question of the fairness of the subject’s 
situation while ignoring the issue of the perceived relative positions of the subject and 
the object. We can therefore resent another/others for considering they unjustly and 
intentionally caused us injury, without comparing ourselves with them or considering 
them to benefit from undeserved good fortune. 
With these distinctions between different forms of resentment in mind, we are 
now in conditions to better understand how populism works. As a logic of social and 
political action, resentment patterns social and political relationships in one of two 
ways (or sub-logics): either as socio-political resentment, as reconstructed by Scottish 
moral sentiment theory and which is motivated by moral indignation, or Nietzschean-
like ressentiment, which results from envy. This means that the populist logic of 
resentment moves in the space between pure indignation and radical envy. It must 
include certain elements in simultaneity: a normative element, i.e. a reference to 
democratic norms, notably democracy’s superordinate commitment to equality and 
popular sovereignty, or the idea of the people as the ground of political legitimacy; a 
comparative element imbued with that normativity: i.e., a sense of undeserved 
inferiority; a rivalry between parts, where one part is deemed responsible or to blame 
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for the underserved inferiority of the other in view of shared commitments; and a 
redemptive appeal to the restoration of democratic equality made for the part in the 
name of the whole – ‘the people’, hence the –ism, populism. These four necessary and 
sufficient conditions for populism to exist enable us to distinguish between populist 
and non-populist cases with greater clarity than before. Consider the first condition, 
which refers to indignation at the violation of democratic norms and principles. This 
does not constitute on its own a basis for populism, as the example of white 
opposition to the Apartheid regime in South Africa demonstrates. Even though they 
resented the violation of democratic norms of justice in their political community, 
their politics was not populist because they did not perceive themselves as consigned 
to an underserved position of inferiority by that violation (in effect, they were all too 
aware of being privileged by it). Or, consider the combination of the first two 
conditions, when indignation at the violation of democratic norms and principles is 
combined with a perceived inferior positioning brought about by their negation. 
Again, this does not per se lead to populism. Consider the case of Black Lives Matter. 
This is not a populist movement, where the claims brought forward are of the part in 
the name of the whole (‘the people’), but rather envisage primarily the recognition of 
the part by the other part in its difference. Finally, consider a case where the first three 
conditions are present. Let us think of Marxism. Although Marxism posits class 
struggle as the engine of history, both parts capitalists and workers, are deemed 
victims of the same system: capitalism. As such, Marxism resents systemic 
inequalities, but in recognizing their structural nature, ultimately frees the agents from 
responsibility or blame. Its impetus is not moralising. This is not the case, however, 
with Latin American movements under the banner of twenty-first century socialism. 
Their efforts at political mobilization rely often on resentment being directed at the 
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attitudes and intentions of the alleged perpetrators of workers’ suffering. Their action 
expresses not mere frustration or malaise, but imputation of responsibility. The basis 
of their claims is not class, but popular sovereignty (hence, they are made in the name 
of the ‘people’). These claims are enthused with a sense of heightened urgency. They 
project a vision of immediate future salvation from the unbearable misery of the here 
and now. This salvific image of the future partly draws its legitimation from a 
mythological view of the past, as in the iconic “rebirth” of Simon Bolivar as a 
mestizo, the mirror image of the humble and virtuous Venezuelan pueblo. This 
combination of all four elements, including its redemptive appeal to the restoration of 






3. The Populist “Politics of Faith” 
Albeit constitutive of populism, redemptive politics is not specifically populist. 
Michael Oakeshott, who first contrasted the “politics of faith” with the “politics of 
scepticism,” (1996: 21-38) went as far as suggesting that the dominant mood in 
modern politics involves the promise of a future better world, i.e. it is redemptive. 
The assumption is that salvation can be achieved through human effort. Oakeshott’s 
sceptical treatment of the “politics of faith” was, of course, but a specific instance of 
the wider liberal suspicion of perfectionism, the doctrine directing society to arrange 
institutions and to define the duties and obligations of individuals so as to achieve the 
most perfect life possible (Rawls 1971: 325). Margaret Canovan uses Oakeshott’s 
distinction in her analysis of populism (1999). She sees redemptive politics as one of 
democracy’s two faces. Populism is said to follow democracy “like a shadow” as one 
of the “radicalisms” that is liable to emerge whenever the gap between the 
“redemptive” and the “pragmatic” faces of democracy is wide enough (1999: 9). 
Canovan’s argument, however, focuses on the redemptive face of democracy, not 
populism’s. Furthermore, implicit in her analysis is the suggestion that populism is 
intrinsic – as a shadow is to the object that casts it – to democracy’s redemptive face. 
Yet the image of populism following democracy like a shadow can be deceptive. 
Although it originates in democracy’s central paradox and is normatively oriented 
towards it, populism has a much more ambiguous relationship with democracy than 
this metaphor suggests (see also Arditi 2007). To see why, let us examine the populist 
“politics of faith” in three successive steps: its temporal orientation, the kind of 
political mobilisation it elicits, and its relationship with democracy. 
 Arguably, there is little agreement in the populist literature regarding the 
temporal orientation of its redemptive dimension. Some of its critics have stressed its 
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retrogressive character, while others emphasise the threat to liberal democracy that its 
progressive redemptive vision represents. Likewise, there are those who stress the 
potential for democratic renewal of populist images of salvation located in the past, 
while others prefer to use populist projections of future redemption to criticise present 
democratic institutions and beliefs. Once we take the perspective of the logic of 
resentment, however, populism’s distinctive temporal-moral structure comes to the 
fore. This complex temporal structure does not give us regulative ‘images’ of the 
future. Rather, it uses an image of the past as to defamiliarize ourselves with the 
present, and restructure our experience in ways distinct from all other forms of 
defamiliarization. 
Populism mourns a lost past but it is not retrogressive. It looks back at the 
original promise of democracy but, unlike nationalism or conservatism, it does not 
construe it in any elaborate form. It merely uses as a normative yardstick to assess the 
present. Given the democratic paradox, the necessary result of this assessment is 
resentment. Resentment is, especially in the case of envy, non-constructive and, both 
in the case of envy and indignation, “painful” (Geuss 2016). We experience this pain 
in the present: our feelings of indignation and envy are experienced as we compare 
ourselves to others, ‘here and now’ (topia). Pain, discomfort, suffering and deeply-
held grievances are as much a driver for populist mobilization as they require 
appeasement and healing: the more people feel wronged by the system, the more 
likely is for them to listen to populist claims of redemption that transform this 
psychological pain into moralised pain. The fact that suffering may be alleviated in 
the future brings little comfort, and the (idealised?) memory that in the past things 
used to be better just makes present grievances worse. Populists promise to ease or 
heal the pain of the “virtuous” people by redeeming democratic equality and 
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inclusion, which they have been denied by the “corrupt” elite: the idealised image of 
past of fallen equality is used to castigate the present as the living embodiment of the 
corruption of that ideal. The present is the culmination of all wrongs. There is an 
urgent need to interrupt the normal flow of time and accelerate towards the future 
(utopia, or the vision of an alternative world). Populism is progressive or forward-
looking. Hope lies in the future: salvation will come in the form of the realization of 
the democratic promise of “rule by the people”. The imagined future is not only 
immanent to the present but also imminent; it is not positioned in some far off future 
time that can only be dimly perceived in the present and, instead, it is about to arrive. 
The populists’ hope, in this way, involves a temporal orientation akin to Emmanuel 
Levinas’s ‘present of the future’ (Levinas, 1987: 76). That is, the new age of populist 
fellowship, appearing in the near distance, represents a future that can almost be 
touched in the present. 
The assumption here is, of course, that human effort can bring about political 
change, social reform and moral redemption. This places populism firmly within the 
remit of perfectionist politics. Much has been written on populist mobilisation 
(Jansen, 2011; Brubaker, 2017: 4-6), including either critical references to its 
Caesarist/Bonapartist tendencies (Espejo xxx, Urbinati xxx), or approving remarks 
regarding its anti-elitist character (Canovan 1999: 3-4). Yet, even in the best 
theoretical treatments of projects of populist mobilisation such as Jansen’s, the 
specifically redemptive nature of populist mobilisation remains elusive: “any 
sustained, large-scale political project that mobilizes ordinarily marginalized social 
sectors into publicly visible and contentious political action, while articulating an 
anti-elite, nationalist rhetoric that valorizes ordinary people.” (italics in the original; 
Jansen 2011: 82) No reference is made here to the promise of a better future that is 
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central to any redemptive political project, populism included. This is because, even 
though he correctly moves away from treating populism as a thing, Jansen’s choice of 
treating populism as a practice ultimately means that he does not address its logic. 
Once we take into account the populist logic of resentment, however, our 
understanding of populist mobilisation is enlarged and its redemptive dimension 
clarified.  
Populist mobilisation, we argue, functions as a collective process of cleanse. 
Independently of the particular organisational form it eventually adopts (movement or 
party, charismatic leadership or horizontal platform of interests), populism seeks to 
purify the political body from the polluting elements that stand in the way from us 
moving beyond the present and moving towards the future. Resentment explains why, 
for the populists, the present is painful and the future must come now. But it also 
helps account for the specific temporality of populist mobilisation. The distance 
between the present and the past, which is mythologically construed, is extended. Yet 
the distance between the present, when painful envy and indignation are experienced, 
and the future, when, it is hoped, suffering will give way to redemptive happiness, is 
compressed. This sense of urgency means that populist mobilisation is not only 
progressive or forward-looking, but immediate: any delays in achieving salvation are 
downright immoral. This immediacy extends to political representation, where forms 
of direct democracy are preferred to representative schemes of government. 
Representative agents cannot be trusted with undetermined time in order to solve the 
problems of the here and now: healing must come now. As the Occupy movement 
shows, this entails a radical suspicion of any form of mediation that stands in the way 
of the part making a redemptive claim to have democratic equality restored in the 
name of the whole, i.e. between the will of the people and its political representation 
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(Vieira 2015). Likewise, political discourse and rhetoric acquire a simple, direct style. 
Any technical details and complex explanations of the sources of the problems and its 
solutions stand in between its immediate resolution.  
Purification here is not simply a matter of categorizing all elements and 
organisations as either one of us, the people, or one of them, the elite. It involves the 
political work of extracting the democracy’s egalitarian promise from a present that 
denies it into a future that fulfils it. This process of moral purge entails both an 
element of collective effervescence (the “enthusiasm” often associated with the 
“politics of faith”) as more and more elements are drawn into it, as either perpetrators 
or victims, and a measure of scapegoating, often in the form of conspiracy theories 
that identify some secretive but influential aristocratic or plutocratic “conspiracy” 
responsible for defrauding the people of their rights (Nugent 2013: 8). While the latter 
is unambiguously problematic for democracy, the former is an inherent feature of 
collective life, able to shape identity and create social bonds (Durkheim 1912). Yet it 
also carries with it the risk, as the Progressive social thinker G.H. Mead would have 
known only too well given his first-hand knowledge of populism in the Midwest, of 
an absolute identification between the individual self and the social group as one gets 
immersed (and lost) in the collective wave of enthusiasm (Mead 1918: 598). The 
populist zeal to purge the corrupt elites from the political community has the potential 
to devolve into vengeance and acquire an apocalyptic tone. This much is clear from a 
novel that Ignatius Donnelly, a Minnesota populist leader, published with Chicago’s 









5. Populist Redemption: The Case of Caesar’s Column 
Caesar’s Column is much more than a 1890s Midwest populist novel. The plot takes 
us a century into the future, the protagonists come from different corners of the world 
to meet their destiny in New York, and as its subtitle indicates – A Story of the 
Twentieth Century – the image of political salvation of the text anticipates in 
important ways the future of populism itself. If it was written and published as the 
term “populist” was yet to enter the English language, Caesar’s Column is one of the 
few cases where a utopian novel actually inspired a political programme. Some of the 
more programmatic passages of Caesar’s Column can be found in the preamble 
Donnelly wrote for the Omaha platform, which launched the Populist Party on July 4, 
1892. A bestseller with 700.000 copies sold within the first decade of publication 
(Ruddick 2003: xiii), Caesar’s Column’s vitriol and anti-Semitic references 
eventually secured it a place among populism’s canon of damned works (Rideout 
1960; Hofstadter 1952: 104-108; Handlin 1954: 185-190). A political text, in which 
the author expresses his populist views, it is also and fundamentally a work of fiction. 
Part of the wave of utopian novels that took America by storm in the late nineteenth-
century (Pfaelzer 1984), Caesar’s Column offers an apocalyptic vision of a future 
where elites insist in ignoring the suffering of the poor.  
 Caesar’s Column asks the reader for an imaginative answer to an implied 
rhetorical question: “What if?” What if the People turned against itself? It is around 
this question that Donnelly constructs one of the most complex and ambivalent 
dystopias in American literature. The immediate political and socio-economic context 
this rhetoric question is posed is an era of deep social unrest, economic crisis and 
mobilization of the labour movement. As with any utopia, Caesar’s Column 
overshoots this immediate context and points towards future social and political 
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alternatives. But as an apocalyptic utopia (Jaher 1964: 130-141), the only species of 
utopia that fills in the space between the question “What if?” and the answer by 
representing the transition from present to the future, Caesar’s Column uniquely 
offers a glimpse both of a latent warning – “the danger of impending labor violence” 
(Pfaelzer 1984: 139) – and of its proposed remedy: a Populist utopia, born out of the 
destruction of the old social order.  
 This uneasy balance between “fear images” and “wish images”, in Elias’ 
parlance (Elias in Kilminster 2014: 6), structures the whole plot. The feeling of 
estrangement this provokes in the readers of Caesar’s Column is undeniable. In a first 
moment it leads readers to relativise both present and future, which then leads them to 
the instant realization of how malleable and contingent both temporal dimensions 
really are. This is how Caesar’s Column passes through and disrupts the material and 
ideological contexts where it originated. By presenting a detailed image of a radically 
and unexpectedly new – what Bloch calls the Novum – and a glimpse into the 
Ultimum – the “total leap out of everything that previously existed” (cited in Wegner 
2002: 20), this singularly ambivalent cataclymistic utopia astonishes whoever reads it. 
 The central “fear image” is, of course, that of Caesar’s column. This column 
represents the symbolic and physical destruction of the old capitalist social order as its 
inner core is made of a quarter of a million corpses. However, as with Bolivar’s 
mestizo transmogrification, this is no empty symbolic sign whose meaning is 
arbitrary, but an “index” (Peirce 1955: 102; 107-108) whose materiality indicates its 
meaning – the destroyed political body as a result of unbridled envy and anger. 
Indices allow us to represent emotions, which cannot be represented directly. Caesar’s 
column allows Donnelly to represent the logic of resentment: the column is not 
resentment, it is not a direct representation of resentment, but it indicates resentment 
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and is connected to it. To get his readers to this dystopian populist index, Donnelly 
makes use of the well-known literary device of narrating a succession of imaginary 
letters. The narrator and protagonist is one Gabriel Weltstein. Gabriel, who is 
attempting to break an international cartel and to sell his wool directly to American 
manufacturers and retailers, writes back to his brother Heinrich in their homeland in 
Uganda, here presented as a Swiss colony, from a futuristic New York set in 1988. 
The path taken by Gabriel from his first arrival at New York up to the macabre 
erection of a column made entirely of body remains in Union Square reveals 
Donnelly’s anxieties and preoccupations. This path constitutes the bulk of the novel. 
As readers are taken along this path, the feeling of estrangement they experience 
makes them all the more susceptible to Donnelly’s social criticisms, both implicit and 
explicit, namely those he makes through his alter-ego, Gabriel Weltstein. 
 Strolling near Central Park, Gabriel suddenly notices a beggar about to be run 
over by an open carriage: with no hesitation, our hero jumps and saves the day. With 
this single event, Donnelly manages to introduce most of the characters and set the 
plot in motion. The beggar comes out to be Max Petion, “a ‘Have’ who has joined 
with the ‘Have-Not’s’ and who maintains a complicated relationship with both.” 
(Rideout 1960: xxix), soon to become Gabriel’s best friend. The car belongs to Prince 
of Cabano, “the wealthiest and most vindictive man in the city,” (CC: 27) a Jewish-
Italian industrial count and one of the novel’s villains. One of its occupants is Estella 
Washington, who will eventually fall in love with our protagonist. If friendship and 
love brings the protagonists together, hatred and resentment will tear society apart.  
 Events are suddenly unleashed by a fortuitous event between two secondary 
individual characters. It is because a French girl, Celestine d’Aublay, a “former 
favorite mistress of” our villain, who “resented her downfall bitterly” that “she hates” 
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her rival, Frederika: “A sudden thought took possession of her mind; she would 
overthrow Frederika just as she herself had been overthrown.” (CC: 74) This private 
rivalry foreshadows the wider conflict that looms outside. This conflict is not 
political, but socioeconomic in character. On the one hand, there are the corrupt rich, 
which Donnelly represents as “the oligarchy.” Although they rule the world, what 
entices the anger of the many is the oligarchs’ accumulation of wealth. On the other 
hand, there is the “Brotherhood of Destruction.” This is a secret international society 
made of Have Not’s, who have been long subject to cruel exploitation and are now 
seeking revenge.  
What moves the oligarchy and the Brotherhood of Destruction against each 
other is resentment. Yet this is not socio-political resentment, according to which one 
actively and energetically opposes the experience of injustice. Although feelings of 
moral indignation do figure in Caesar’s Column, they appear as inert signs of a 
bygone era, utterly unable to change the course of events. Our epoch – with its 
explosive combination of mass democracy and increasing inequality – is driven by the 
logic of Nietzschean ressentiment, the destructive visceral sentiment of envy that 
motivates “the many” to revolt against “the few” and eventually destroy human 
civilization in the process. Torn between generalized feelings of nemesis and 
phthonos, the different faces of the most dangerous civic emotion of all, society is 
doomed.  
Nowhere is this clearer than in the conflict between the representative heads of 
the many and the few: Caesar Lomellini, the commander-in-chief of the Brotherhood, 
and Prince of Cabano. Blinded by Nemesis, the Greek goddess of vengeance, Caesar, 
once a “quiet, peaceable industrious” farmer who lost everything to the extortionist 
usury of urban bankers, now sees anything but getting back at his nemesis, Prince of 
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Cabano, the living embodiment of the system responsible for Caesar’s downfall. But 
what was at first nemesis – moral resentment – industrial capitalism turned into envy-
based ressentiment. Ressentiment is not merely a sub-logic that organises emotions 
and passions making them the basis of political agency; there is a definite somatic 
dimension to it (Chrostowska, 2017: 273). Caesar’s body changes as the revolt 
progresses, his physical mutations being a result of Donnelly’s own political and 
racial anxieties (e.g. CC: 149) concerning the “immigrant-worker-anarchist-socialist 
complex.” (Wegner 2002: 123) No less importantly, this transmogrification is also a 
projection of populist hopes and fears: Caesar’s body, after all, represents the populist 
People. It functions as another populist index. Caesar’s body is not the populist 
People, it is not a direct representation of the populist People, but it points and is 
connected to it. This is why Caesar’s death represents the impending threat of 
populism. The world is corrupt; it needs redemption. Either keep democracy’s 
promise, or democide will follow. This is reinforced by a concomitant transformation 
of the physical space. New York’s streets and buildings are not simply where action 
takes place; they are themselves part and parcel of this imaginary transmutation 
animated by resentment, becoming darker and narrower as capitalist society moves 
toward apocalypse.  
 After destruction, comes redemption. Resorting to imagery from the Book of 
Revelation, Caesar’s Column presents the populist revolt as representing punishment 
and purgation. For Donnelly, “redemptive” is the adjective that might apply to the 
sacrifice of Christ on Calvary, the death of the One for the salvation of the many. It 
may also be taken to mean the murder of outsiders so that the nation could undertake 
a project of populist politics that might later redeem a lost democratic order. In the 
novel, Gabriel and his friends manage to escape death at the eleventh hour by flying 
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to safety in distant Uganda. “Uganda” functions here as a “wish image” that enables 
Donnelly to answer the second, positive part of his “What if” question: What if one 
could tame resentment and make the populist People sovereign? How would a 
populist “scheme of government” (CC: 303) look like?  
Having protected themselves from others by building a “high wall” as to 
“completely cut off communication with the external world” (CC: 300), a typical 
populist icon (Peirce 1955) and highly significant political strategy (e.g. Brown 
2010), they turn to a second task: how to “protect ourselves from ourselves; for the 
worst enemies of a people are always found in their own midst, in their passions and 
vanities.” (CC: 301) Having just presented the apocalyptic consequences of the most 
powerful and dangerous passion, Donnelly wants his readers to see the positive, 
redemptive side of resentment. This takes us to a future populist utopia where the 
“people” has been constructed as to avoid the misgivings of both liberal democracy 
and of “Karl Marx and the German socialists of the last century” (CC: 161). Donnelly 
names the governing body of his utopia, “The People”. Adopting a corporatist model 
of political representation, which makes it dependent on a pre-political division of the 
political body according to each group’s occupations, “The People” is divided into 
three branches, each elected exclusively by and from a specific corporation: 
producers, merchants and manufacturers, and intellectuals (CC: 304). “The People” 
signals the co-presence of both variants of utopianism in the text, open-ended and 
programmatic. This, in turn, mirrors the equivalent ambivalence of redemptive 
populist politics as social text. This enables us to address anew a number of 
significant issues regarding not only the character of redemptive/utopian politics, but 
also of populism, namely in its relationship with democracy.  
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Caesar’s Column, with its “ambiguous signals and complex structure” (Saxton 
1967: 232), provides a near-perfect illustration of how resentment in topia gives 
populists the (critical and antinomian) redemptive impulse towards utopia in the form 
of the promise of a better world through action of the sovereign people. Populism, 
unlike ideologies, does not seriously attempt to imagine the real future of our polities. 
As Canovan observes, the redemptive impulse is left relatively unarticulated by 
populists, carrying “with it much less by way of a vividly imagined utopia than most 
forms of socialism” (1999: 11). But it is not absent, either. Rather, it serves the quite 
different function of transforming our own present into the determinate past of 
something yet to come. Concretely, this residual programmatic utopianism gives 
expression to the sub-logic of ressentiment. As radical envy, populism can lead to a 
process of collective healing and purification in the form of an idealised image of the 
future at the cost of ignoring present “needs, interests and aspirations”. This entails 
numerous risks. As radical envy is not limited to material considerations, populism 
can slide into racism. As populists can seek scapegoats for the social group’s 
perceived sense of undeserved inferiority in other social classes and/or other ethnic 
groups, ontological ressentiment holds the potential of combining class-based 
prejudice with “prejudice concerning ethnic descent coupled with discriminatory 
action” (Bethencourt 2014: 1). Another risk is what in Brazil became known as a 
“coalition of paralysis”. Populism can bring about a situation of ungovernability, 
whereby an indeterminate number of interest groups, social movements and class 
representatives is brought to the negotiating table, but only to see their disparate 
claims ultimately annul each other. A further risk is, of course, political violence. As 
the apocalyptic Caesar’s Column makes abundantly clear, the road to metaphysical 
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redemption can indeed be a dangerous one, with the potential of destroying 
democracy itself. 
Populism is not a purely open-ended form of utopianism, either. Yet its open-
ended utopian character, as social critique moved by socio-political resentment or 
moral indignation, it holds a valuable potential to reinforce democracy from within. 
After all, redemptive populist claims are made by a part in the name of the whole by 
reference to democracy’s own normative landscape. Of course, populism works as a 
bee: after it stings, it dies. But it is in the act of stinging, however excessive and 
strident it may sound to democracy’s elites, that lies some of its democratic value. We 
thus concur with the advocates of populism that one should not readily dismiss 
populism’s democratic credentials. However, this is not exactly because of the 
reasons they think. In Caesar’s Column as elsewhere, redemption is less defined 
against representative democracy (that per se would lead to participatory politics, not 
populism) than as a response to the pain and suffering caused by socio-political 
resentment, which is based upon moral indignation. These emotional responses, in 
turn, are eminently educable through public institutions such as the education system 
and criminal law (Mihai 2016: 68). But we also agree with the opponents of populism 
that it can indeed be a danger to democracy. However, this is not because the logic of 
populism is enmity, but because socio-political resentment can slide into ontological 
ressentiment. It is this ambivalence that, if we are right, ultimately explains 
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